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LIABILITY OF PRINCIPAL FOR FRAUD O AGENT,
COMMITTED FOR AGENT'S BENEFIT.
The question of the liability of the principal for fraud com-
mitted by the agent within the apparent scope of his authority,
and under cover of the principal's name and business, but for
the agent's benefit, is one that is by no means settled. There
is a sharp conflict of authority on this question and two well-
defined and directly conflicting lines of decisions have been
followed in the courts of the several States. One group of
State Courts and the United States Supreme Court have fol-
lowed what is commonly referred to as the English rule, while,
another group has followed the so-called New York rule.
The question most frequently arises in cases involving the
issue of fictitious bills of lading, and the fraudulent issue of
certificates of corporation stocks; but has also been presented
for adjudication in widely varying types of cases, such as,
misrepresentation to a subscriber of a mercantile agency as
to the financial standing of a merchant; the fraudulent cer-
tifying of a bank check by the bank's cashier; fraudulent sale
of property by an agent of a real estate firm for his own bene-
fit, and many others. The legal question involved in all of
these cases, however, seems to be the same: e. g., the liability
of the personally innocent principal when the fraud was not
perpetrated for his benefit.
In England the decisions seem to have been uniformly to
the effect that a principal is never liable under such circum-
stances until the comparatively recent case of Lloyd v. Grace,
Smith & Co.,1 which apparently overrules the view referred to
by our courts as the English rule. This case is authority for
the proposition that "A principal is liable for the fraud of his
agent acting within the scope of his authority, wnetner the
fraud is committed for the benefit of the principal or for the
benefit of the agent."
1. (1912) Appeal Cases, 716.
ISO
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Among the English cases most frequently cited as author-
ity for the proposition that the principal is not liable, is that
of Grant v. Norway.2 This case decided that the owner of a
ship was not liable in an action upon the case by the endorsees
of a bill of lading issued by the ship's master for goods which
had never been shipped. The decision was based upon the
ground that the master was not to be considered as the agent
of the owner in that behalf. Jervis, C. J., in delivering the
judgment of the Court said, in part:
"The master is the general agent to perform all things
relating to the usual employment of his ship; and the author-
ity of such an agent to perform all things usual in the line of
business in which he is employed, cannot be limited by any
private order or direction not known to the party dealing with
him. It is not contended that the captain had any real au-
thority to sign bills of lading, unless the goods had been
shipped; nor can we discover any ground upon which a party
taking a bill of lading by endorsement, would be justified in
assuming that he had authority to sign such bills, whether the
goods were on board or not."
Professor Huffcutt in his text on Agency' says of the cases
of this class: "It is held that the principal is not liable, the
argument being that the agent is authorized to do what is
usual in his agency and it is not usual to issue fictitious bills
of lading. This play upon words, if restorted to in other cases,
would excuse the constituent for every tort of his representa-
tive." The rule laid down in the above case has been fol-
lowed, however, and the case cited as authority for the rule,
by the U. S. Supreme Court in Friedlander v. Texas etc. Ry.
In Minnesota, in the case of National Bank of Commerce
v. C. B. & N. R. R. Co.,5 the principal case is cited and relied
2. Common Bench, 665.
3. Huffcut on Agency, Sec. 156.
4. 130 U. S. 416.
5. 44 Minn. 224.
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on for the proposition that "even as against a bona fide con-
signee or endorsee for value, the carrier is not estopped by
the statements of the bill of lading, issued by his agent, from
showing that no goods were in fact received for transporta-
tion.' In the later case of Swedish Am. Bank v. C. B. & Q.
R. R.,6 the rule in Grant v. Norway is again followed, the
earlier case of McCord v. Western Union Telegraph Co.7 ap-
parently being overruled by these cases.
In National Bank v. Ry. (supra) the Court said in com-
menting on McCord v. Western Union Tel. Co.: "The reason-
ing of these cases is in substance that the question does not
at all depend upon the negotiability of bills of lading, but
upon the principle of estoppel in pais; that where a principal
has clothed an agent with power to do an act in case of the
existence of some extrinsic fact, necessarily and peculiarly
within the knowledge of the agent, and of the existence of
which the act of executing the power is itself a representation,
the principal is estopped from denying the existence of the
fact, to the prejudice of a third person who has dealt with
the agent or acted upon his representation in good faith, in the
ordinary course of business. This rule this Court in effect
adopted and applied in McCord v. Western Union Tel. Co.
It is urged that force is added to this reasoning in view of th&
fact that bills of lading are viewed and dealt with in the com-
mercial word as quasi negotiable, and consequently it is de-
sirable that they should be viewed with confidence and not dis-
trust; and that for these considerations it is better to cast the
risk of the goods not having been shipped upon the carrier,
who has placed it in the power of agents of his own choosing to
make these representations, rather than upon the innocent
consignee or indorsee, who, as a rule, has no means of ascer-
taining the fact.
"If the question was res integra, we confess that it seems to
us that this argument would be very cogent. But, on the other
6. 96 Minn. 436.
7. 39 Minn. 181.
1991
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hand, it may be said that carriers are not in the business of
issuing and dealing in bills of lading in the same sense in
which bankers issue and deal in bills of exchange; that their
business is transporting property; and that if the statements
in the receipt part of bills of lading are to be held conclusive
upon them, although false, it would open so wide a door for
fraud and collusion that the disastrous consequences to the
carriers would far outweigh the inconvenience resulting to the
commercial world from the opposite rule. It is also to be ad-
mitted that it requires some temerity to attack either the pol-
icy or the soundness of the rule which seems to have stood the
test of experience, which has been approved by so many emi-
nent courts, and under which the most successful commercial
nation in the world has developed and conducted her vast com-
merce ever since the inception of carriers' bills of lading.
But, on questions of commercial law, it is eminently desirable
that there be uniformity. It is even more important that the
rule be uniform and certain than that it be the best one that
might be adopted. Moreover, on questions of general com-
mercial law the Federal courts refuse to follow the decisions
of the State courts, and determine the law according to their
own views of what it is. It is therefore very desirable that on
such questions the State courts should conform to the doctrine
of the Federal courts. The inconvenience and confusion that
would follow from having two conflicting rules on the same
question in the same State, one in the Federal courts and an-
other in the State courts, is of itself almost a sufficient reason
why we should adopt the doctrine of the Federal courts on
this question."
The rule enunciated in Grant v. Norway has been followed
and the case cited by the courts of, among others, Washington
8. 42 Wash. 572. (Compare with 67 Wash. 286.)
9. 22 Ohio St. 118. (Compare with 56 Ohio St. 351, in which the opposite
view seems to prevail.)
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in Roy & Roy v. Torthern Pac. R. R. Co.;' Ohio in Dean v.
King,9 and Missouri in La. N.ational Bank v. Laveille.10
The courts of New York, however, refused to adopt the
rule laid down in Grant v. Norway and in Armour v. Mich.
Central R. R. Co.," held that the carrier was liable for non-
delivery of goods represented by bills of lading issued by his
agent on the faith of what subsequently proved to be forged
warehouse receipts. .Although the facts are somewhat differ-
ent from that of Grant v. Norway, inasmuch as the agent of
the railroad company had acted in good faith, the Court, per
Dwight, C., said in part: "Grant v. Norway has been subject
to much and severe criticism, as being adverse to the general
view prevailing in the courts of this State, where confidence
has been reposed in an agent and an apparent authority con-
ferred upon him, that the principal must suffer from an actual
exercise of authority not exceeding the appearance of that
which is granted. When one of two innocent persons must
suffer in such a case, that person must bear the loss who re-
posed the confidence. So far as Grant v. Norway stands in
the way of this doctrine, it must be deemed to be overruled."
This case has been followed by subsequent cases in the
same and other jurisdictions. In Bank of Batavia v. N. Y.
L. E. & W. R. B. Co.,' 2 the question arose through the issu-
ance of a bill of lading, for which no goods were received, in
pursuance of a conspiracy between defendants' agent and a
third person. The Court held that the doctrine of estoppel in
pais applied and, following Armour v. Mich. Cent. R. R., al-
lowed the plaintiff to recover.
This rule seems to be firmly established in New York and
10. 52 Missouri 380. (Compare with 259 Mo. 637, commented on in this
note.)
11. 65 N. Y. 111.
12. 106 N. Y. 195.
13. 108 Pa. St. 529.
14. 103 Ill. 293.
15. 20 Kas. 519.
16. 10 Neb. 556.
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has been followed in Pensylvania; 13 Illinois ;14 Kansas;15 Ne-
braska, " and South Dakota.17
Thus, it will be seen, the group of State courts which fol-
low the New York rule is in irreconciliable conflict with the
courts which follow the rule laid down in Grant v. Norway and
approved by the United States Supreme Court, at least in
cases involving the issue of fictitious bills of lading and ware-
house receipts.
The other principal class of cases in which the question un-
der consideration is presented, that of cases involving the
fraudulent issue of stock certificates, seems to be as con-
flicting.
Vhat, until Lloyd v. Grace, Smith & Co. (1912) (supra),
had been the rule followed in these cases in England, seems to
have been largely based on an opinion delivered by Mr. Jus-
tice Willes in Barnick v. English Joint Stock Bank .1 8 The
facts of this case were as follows: The plaintiff having for
some time, on a guarantee of the defendants, supplied J. D.,
a customer of theirs, with oats on credit, for carrying out a
government contract, refused to continue to do so unless he
had a better guarantee. The defendants' manager thereupon
gave him a written guarantee to the effect that the customer's
check on the bank in the plaintiff's favor, in payment for the
oats supplied, should be paid, on receipt of the government
money, in priority to any other payment, "except to this
bank." J. D. was then indebted to the bank to the amount of
12,000 pounds, but this fact was not known to the plaintiff,
nor was it communicated to him by the manager. The plain-
tiff thereupon supplied the oats to the value of 1227 pounds;
the government money, amounting to 2676 pounds, was re-
ceived by J. D., and paid into the bank; but J. D.'s check for
the price of oats drawn on the bank in favor of the plaintiff
was dishonored by the defendants, who claimed to retain the
whole sum of 2676 pounds, in payment of J. D.'s debt to them.
17. 12 So. Dak. 643.
18. L. R. 2 Ex. 259.
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The plaintiff brought an action for false representation and
for money had and received. The trial court, on the evidence
given for the plaintiff, ruled there was no evidence to go to the
jury in support of the plaintiff's case, and accordingly di-
rected a non-suit, but signed a bill of exception setting out the
evidence. On review the judgment of the Court of Exchequer
was delivered by Mr. Justice Willes and held:
First. That there was evidence to go to the jury that the
manager knew and intended that the guarfantee should be un-
availing, and fraudulently concealed from the plaintiff the
fact which would make it so.
Secondly. That the defendants would be liable for such
fraud in their agent.
Thirdly. That the fraud was properly charged in the dec-
laration as the fraud of the defendants.
It is apparent, after scrutinizing the facts, that the ques-
tion under consideration in this note, namely, fraud for the
agent's benefit, was not involved in this case. Here the fraud
perpetrated by the manager was clearly for the benefit, not
of the manager, but of the bank. In the course of his opinion,
however, Mr. Justice 'rilles gave utterance to the statement
that the general rule, which has been followed by the subse-
quent English cases involving the question under considera-
tion, until the case of Lloyd v. Grace, Smith & Co. (1912)
(supra), is "that the master is answerable for every such
wrong of the servant or agent as is committed in the course of
the service and for the master's benefit,19 though no express
command or privity of the master be proved."
The first important case in which the ruling in Barwick's
case was discussed was that of Mackay v. Commercial Bank of
19. The italics are the writer's.
186
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New Brunswick,20 decided in 1874. In that case the ruling of
Mr. Justice Willes was reaffirmed. There the fraud was again
-Tor the benefit of the principal. Sir Montague Smith, in de-
livering the judgment of the court, observed that it was re-
garded as "'settled law that a principal is answerable where
he has received a benefit from the fraud of his agent, acting
within the scope of his authority."
The case which probably is most frequently cited by Amer-
ican courts and' text book writers as being an authority for the
English rule, that of the British Mutual Banking Co. v. The
Charnwood Forest Railway Company,2 was decided in the
Court of Appeals in 1887. '3lke facts presented were sub-
stantially these: The secretary of a company answered ques-
tions which were put to him as secretary as to the validity of
certain debenture stock of the company. The answers were
untrue and were fraudulently made by the secretary for his
own benefit. In an action against the company for loss aris-
ing from the representations, the jury found that the secretary
was held out by the company as a person to answer such in-
quiries on their behalf. In delivering the judgment of the
court, that the company was not liable, Lord Justice Bowen
said in part:
"The true rule, as it seems to me, was enuncated
by the Exchequer Chamber in a judgment of Willes, J., de-
livered in the case of Barwick v. English Joint Stock Bank.
'The general rule,' says Wffles, J., 'is that the master is an-
swerable for every such wrong of his servant or agent as is
committed in the course of his service and for his master's
benefit, though no express command or privity of the master
be proved.' "
Again, in Ruben v. Great Fingall Consolidated,2 2 decided
in the House of Lords in 1906, we find the rule laid down by
20. L. R. 5 P. C. 394.
21. L. R. 18 Q. B. Div. 714.
22. (1906) A. C. at page 145.
187
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Mr. Justice Willes quoted by Lord Davey, as authority for the
proposition that "Where the secretary is acting fraudulently
for his own illegal purposes, no representation by him relat-
ing to the matter will bind his employer." However, the ex-
act question under consideration in this note was not involved,.
inasmuch as there was no evidence that the company had ever
held out the secretary as having authority to do anything more
than the mere ministerial act of delivering share certificates,
when duly made, to the owners of the shares. The secretary
had forged the signatures of the two directors whose signa-
tureg were required and had fraudulently affixed the seal of
the company. Here no confidence had been reposed in the
secretary and no apparent authority conferred upon him to
do the acts occasioning the injury, therefore, the case is not
within the class of cases of fraud by the agent in the exercise
of acts "within fhe appearance of the authority conferred up-
on him." The quotation from Lord Davey's opinion, not be-
ing necessary to the decision of the case, must be regarded as
dictum. It is apparent, however, that the rules being cited as
authority for the proposition uttered by Lord Davey in a case
decided by such an eminent tribunal would carry great weight
in substantiating the principlee as the true English rule.
In the United States the New York courts early took a
directly conflicting view. In New York & New Haven R. R. v.
Schuyler,23 generally referred to as the leading New York
case, the purchasers of stock fraudulently issued by the rail-
road's agent, in excess of the authorized capital of the rail-
road, and for the agent's benefit, were allowed to recover dam-
ages sustained by such fraud from the railroad company.
Although, in this case, there was another element, that of neg-
ligence on the part of the railroad company in failing to dis-
cover the fraud, which was continuous over a period of seven
years, and until the agent became insolvent and resigned from
23. 34 N. Y. 30.
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'his position as agent, it is cited as authority for the rule that
the principal is liable for his agent's fraud although commit-
ted for the agent's benefit. This doctrine has beeni followed
by succeeding cases in New York and other States, many of
them much stronger than the prilcipal case inasmuch as the
element of negligence is not present in them.
The case of Fifth Avenue Bank of N. Y. v. Forty-second
Street and Grand St. Ferry R. R. Co01 is more in point to the
question because there the certificates of stock were not only
fraudulently issued by the agent but the signature of the
company's president on the certificate was forged by him as
well. It was held that the fact that an official signature to the
certificate was forged does not extinguish the liability of the
company to the innocent person to whom the certificate was
fraudulently issued where the forgery had been done by or at
the instance of an officer of the corporation, intrusted with
the custody of its stock books, and held out by the company as
the source of information on that subject.
The doctrine of the liability of the principal for the fraud
of his agent in issuing fictitious certificates of stock has been
followed, among others, by the courts of Massachusetts,25
Kentucky,"8 Pennsylvania,2' Maryland,28 'Minnesota ;* and in
the case of a money order message fraudulently transmitted
by an operator employed by a telegraph company the company
was held liable for loss occasioned by such fraud30
In Missouri the case of National Bank of Webb City v.
Newell Morse Realty CoY' presented facts somewhat similar
to those under judicial investigation in the case of New York
New Haven R. R. v. Schuyler (supra). In both cases there
24. 137 N. Y. 231.
25. 150 Mass. 200.
26. 91 Ky. 94.
27. 127 Pa. St. 601.
28. 60 Md. 36.
29. 39 Minn. 181. (Compare with 44 Minn. 224.)
30. 103 Fed. 841.
31. 259 Mo. 637.
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had been a fraudulent issue of stock by an agent which was
made possible by the negligence of the corporations. The de,
fendant was held liable in the Missouri case, Judge Graves, im
delivering the opinion, saying in part: "The rule to be de-
clared is that if the certificate of stock fair upon its face, is,
without notice and good faith, bought or taken as collateral,
and such certificate turns out to be spurious, then the corpora-
tion is liable for the damages occasioned, whether such cer-
tificate be fraudulently or negligently put in circulation. In
the case at bar there was fraud upon the part of Newell and
the grossest negligence upon the part of Newell and Blair, and
other officers and directors of the corporation. For these
things the corporation itself is liable to the plaintiff."
This doctrine seems to be almost universally followed in
the United States, and some of the courts have gone so far as
to hold that a bona fide purchaser of a certificate of stock may
recover even though his transferor was particeps crimines
to the fraud of the agent. Thus, it is obvious that where the
corporation would have a good defense against the original
holder of the certificate, and would be successful in an action
to have the certificate canceled, that these rights and equities
may be cut off by a transfer of the certificate to a bona fide
purchaser for value. This view is founded on the theory that
the recitals in the certificate are continuous misrepresenta-
tions and that the corporation is estopped from denying them
against a person, who in the absence of suspicious circum-
stances, relied upon them.
The opposite view of the principal's liability, as illustrated
in the case of The British Mutual Banking Co. v. The Charn-
wood Forest Railway Co. (supra) seems to have been held in
England until a comparatively recent date. In 1912 the House
of Lords in the case of Lloyd v. Grace, Smith & Co.,82 held that
a principal is liable for the fraud of his agent acting within
the scope of his authority, whether the fraud is committed for
32. L. R. 1912 Appeal Cases, 716.
33. 101 U. S. 557.
1[90
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the benefit of the principal or for the benefit of the agent.
In this case the dicta of Lord Bowen in British Mutual Bank-
ing Company v. Charnwood Forest Railway, and of Lord
Davey in Ruben v. Great Fingall Consolidated, to the effect
that a principal could never be liable where the fraud of the
agent was not for the principal's benefit, was expressly over-
ruled as erroneous and not necessary to the decision of either
case. The dictum overruled in each of these cases was based
on the rule enunciated by Mr. Justice Willes in Barwick v.
English Joint Stock Bank (supra), but more especially on the
clause "and for the master's benefit." Lord MacNaghten in
overruling this dicta, said: "It was contended that Barwick's
case is an authority for the proposition that a principal is not
liable for the fraud of his agent unless the fraud is committed
for the benefit of the principal * * * but I agree with my
noble and learned friend, Lord Halsbury, that the case has
been misunderstood in late years, and that it does not decide
any such proposition * * * and I think it follows from
the decision, and the ground on which it is based, that in the
opinion of the Court a principal must be liable for the fraud
of his agent committed in the course of his agent's employ-
ment and not beyond the scope of his agency, whether the
fraud be committed for the principal's benefit or not."
Since this case it would seem that the English rule corre-
sponds with that followed in New York in Schuyler v. R. R.
and succeeding cases in that and other jurisdictions.
It appears quite singular to the writer that the courts are
so much more in accord in cases involving the issue by an
agent of fictitious stock certificates than in those involving the
fraudulent issue of bills of lading. In the first class, the ten-
dency to hold the principal liable seems to be universal in the
United States while there is a marked aversion to doing so in
the latter class. Sometimes we see the courts in the same
jurisdiction holding one way in a case of the first class, and an-
other, and conflicting way, in the second class, although the
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol8/iss3/6
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principle of law involved is, apparently, the same in both
classes of cases.
These cases appear irreconcilable unless there is some in-
herent distinction in the legal efficacy of bills of lading and
certificates of stock. While bills of lading possess some of
the attributes of negotiable instruments it has been held that
an assignment of a bill of lading by the consignor to the con-
signee gives the consignee only such rights to the goods of
which they are a symbol as were vested in the consignor;
Shaw v. Railroad Co.,33 Saltus &O Saltus v. Everett.2 4 On the
other hand, it has been held that fictitious stock certificates are
so far negotiable that under some circumstances a better title
may be given to the shares which they symbolize than that
vested in the transferor.35
In bills of lading issued without the delivery of goods to
the carrier the element of fraud is always present because of
the recitals therein that goods have been so delivered, and the
consignor, although he might be innocent of any fraudulent
intent, would have notice that the recital is a misrepresenta-
tion and by assenting to the issue of the bill would be a party
to the fraud. It would seem to follow under the rule enun-
ciated in Shaw v. Railroad Co. and Saltus & Saltus v. Ev-
erett (supra) that the defense of fraud available against the
consignor would be available against those claiming through
or under him.
A certificate of stock, on the contrary, contains no recitals
which could be construed as giving notice of fraud. In cases
then where the original subscriber acts in good faith the de-
fense of participes crimnines would not be available in an ac-
tion on such a certificate. It would also seem to follow that
because the recitals or declarations contained in such certifi-
cates are held to be continuing misrepresentations that even
in cases where the original subscriber was actually a party
34. 20 Wendell, 267.
35. Fletcher's Enc. of Corporations, Vol. 5, sec. 3781 and cases cited therein.
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to the fraud, such a defense would not be available against a
bona fide transferee for value.
This view would reconcile the two classes of cases and jus-
tify the apparent conflict in States where the principal is held
liable in the certificate cases and not liable in the bill of lading
cases.
To the query why the same rule cannot be applied to the
recitals in bills of lading the only answer is that the courts,
except those which consistently follow the New York rule, in
both classes of cases, have held otherwise.
Probably the most that can be said about the subject as a
whole is that it is an anomalous question 6 but why the courts
do not follow one of the two rules consistently, as the New
York courts seem to do, is unexplainable unless, as suggested,
there is some inherent difference in the instruments involved.
JAms 0. PORTER, '24.
36. The question has been settled in the Federal Courts as to bills of lading
for interstate shipments by statute (Barnes Federal Code, Sec. 7999). Also as
to intrastate shipments in those States in which the Uniform Bills of Lading Act
has been adopted; for Missouri law on this subject see R. S. Mo. 1919, Sec. 13545.
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